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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
FLORENCE P. HO\VARD, also known as
F. P. HOWARD, Deceased,
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, LTD.,
as Administrator with the Will Annexed
of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, Deceased, and COLINA FERRIE,

Appellants,
-vs-

Case No. 8019

HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST,
ERNEST HOWARD, THE PROTESTANT
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS
and McGILL UNIVERSITY, MILDRED
BLACK, HILDA B L A C K , ROGER
BLACK, RACHEL HELPS, and WALKER
BANK & TRUST COMPAN~ a U~h
Banking corporation, Executor of the
Estate of Florence P. Howard, also known
as F. P. Howard, Deceased.

Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Florence P. l-Ioward died in Montreal,_ Canada on the
28th day of January, 1952.
On Petition of Walker Bank & Trust Company,
certain holographic documents, dated February 6, 1939,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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June 3, 1940, May 7, 1949 and January 14, 1952, were
admitted to probate as the last will and testament of
the said decedent.
On November 15, 1952, Walker Bank & Trust Company filed a Petition to Construe Will, in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, known as Case No. 34386;
National Trust Company, Ltd., as Administrator with the
Will Annexed of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie,
deceased and Colina Ferrie, filed an Answer to said
Petition, as others did.
Judge Clarence E. Baker (R. 140) had made an
Order, in case No. 34386, consolidating for hearing the
Petition to Construe Wills and the Contest of the Order
Admitting Wills to Probate.
Thereafter, Notice was given by the Executor that
the Petition to Construe the Will and the Contest of the
Order Admitting Wills to Probate, had been set by
Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., before himself at 10:00 o'clock
A.M. on the 19th day of January, 1953. (R. 123).
After the consolidated hearing on January 19 and
20, 1953, Judge Ray Y an Cott, Jr., made a Minute Entry,
on February 10, 1953, which states, in effect, that the
Motion for construction of wills having been heard on
January 20, 1953, it is Ordered that the four instruments
mentioned in the Executor's Petition to Construe the
Will are declared to be the last will and testament of
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the deceased, Florence P. Howard, and that all four wills
are valid and constitute the will of the said deceased
and should be administered as a whole, except in so far
as they are irreconcilable as to particular bequests and
each should be given effect in so far as possible. (R. 198).
This was carried into paragraph 3 of the Findings of
Fact, in said case No. 34386, signed by Judge Ray Van
Cott, Jr., on March 23, 1953:
"3. That said four (4) instruments above
described, constitute and are the last will and
testament of the said decedent, 'all subject to
probate as such, except in-so-far as they are irreconcilable as to any particular bequests, and said
instruments dated February 6, 1939 and June 3,
1940 were not revoked or superseded by the instrument dated l\Iay 7, 1949."
Before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree were presented to the Court, Appellants
herein Petitioned for, and were granted, on March 17,
1953, the right to take an Intermediate Appeal to the
Supreme Court, from the Order denying Appellants
herein the right to intervene in the will contest, and the
Supreme Court denied the Intermediate Appeal on April
29, 1954.
On May 14, 1953, Appellants filed Notice of Appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, dated
March 23, 1953, and denial of a Motion for a New Trial.
This Appeal bears the No. 8019.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Helen Duys, Ethel Forrest and Ernest F. Howard
appealed from that portion of the Decree dismissing their
contest, which Appeal bears the No. 8021, and said cases,
8019 and 8021 were consolidated in this Court.
The Record for consolidated cases No. 8019 and No.
8021 is already in the Supreme Court, under Case No.
7970.
The Minute Order of February 10, 1953, construing
the will, is carried over almost verbatim into the Findings
of Fact, and the Findings and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Decree were a result of the consolidated
hearing, wherein the Court, by its Findings, attempted
to construe the instruments. Keeping in mind the Petition to Construe and the issues raised there as to whether
any of the instruments are the will of the decedent and
whether the last instrument is the will, the parties may
be bound by this Judgment.
57 Am. J ur, Sec. 1034, Page 670;
Vol. 4, Page on Wills, Ch. 49, Sec. 1611, Page 602;
69 C. J., Sec. 2052, Page 895.
The Motion of intervention of National Trust Company, Ltd., as Administrator with the Will Annexed of
the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, deceased, and Colina
Ferrie, in the Contest, was denied and they were not
admitted as parties to the Contest. They answered the
Petition to Construe Wills and by the Findings, Conclusions and Decree therein, were made parties to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Construction Judgment by Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr.,
and they are properly here on an appeal from such Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree.
The single set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are a culmination of the consolidated hearing and
contain the attempt of the Court to construe the instruments.
The decision of Judge Van Cott on the Petition
to Construe the Will and the Answers thereto, fails to
find on the issues presented, and leaves to the discretion
of the Executor not only the interpretation but the distribution. Unless this Court passes on the attempted construction, there will be uncertainties and ambiguities
even on distribution as to the will of the decedent, and
the rights of the heirs and legatees will not be protected.
Additional facts, which Appellants herein desire to
set out, are contained in Appellant's Brief in Case No.
7970, and particularly Point IV thereof, which facts are
hereby incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
POINTS TO BE RELIED ON:
POINT NO. I.
THE FOUR INSTRUMENTS ARE SO INCONSISTENT
AND IRRECONCILABLE, THEY CANNOT CONSTITUTE A
WILL.

POINT NO. II.
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATRIX WAS TO REVOKE THE PREVIOUS INSTRUMENTS AND TO MAKE
ONLY THE INSTRUMENT DATED JANUARY 14, 1952, HER
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE FOl,TR INSTRUMENTS ARE SO INCONSISTENT
AND IRRECONCILABLE, THEY CANNOT CONS'TITUTE A
WILL.

Because this Point was fully presented in the Brief
filed by Appellants in Case No. 7970, in Point No. IV
thereof, Appellants refer to said Brief and said Point
and cite to your Honorable Body, in addition thereto:

In 1re Klewer's Estate, Nissen vs. Koch, (Calif.),
268 p. 2d 544.
57 Am. Jur., § 34 P. 58.
POINT NO. II.
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATRIX WAS TO REVOKE THE PREVIOUS INSTRUMENTS AND TO MAKE
ONLY THE INSTRUMENT DATED JANUARY 14, 1952, HER
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

The fundamental rule of interpretation and construction in testamentary instruments is that the intention of the testator, gathered from the four corners of
the instrument, shall govern.
Section 74-2-2, UCA 1953.
57 Am. Jur., Section 1135, p. 731, states:
''All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
testator, for the very purpose of the construction
of a will is to ascertain such intention. Accordingly, while the courts are bound to have regard
to any rules of construction which have been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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established, it is to be remembered that rules and
presumptions relating to the construction of wills
are subordinate to the intention of the testator
'vhere that has been ascertained or is ascertainable, and must yield thereto, however crudely or
artificially the will may be drawn. Rules of construction have their legitimate function when they
are needed to understand the purpose intended
to be embodied in the language used in the will.
They take hold only where uncertainty commences
and let go where it ends, and cannot control or
vary the intent or properly prevent its execution.
The one rule of testamentary construction to
which all others are servient and assistant, it has
been said, is that the meaning intended by the
testator is to be ascertained and given effect in
so far as legally possible. The testatorial intention will control any arbitrary rule, however ancient may be its origin, and the various accepted
canons of construction serve not so much to
restrict or constrain the judicial mind as merely
to aid or guide it in the discovery of the intention
of the testator.''
In the case of In re Beal's Estate, 117 U. 189, 214
P. 2d 525, the Supreme Court said:
''The two rules of construction employed in
the Hardie case have, in substance, been codified
in this state. Sec. 101-2-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides:
'A will is to be construed according to the
intention of the testator. Where his intention
cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have
effect as far as possible.'
Sec. 101-2-10, U. C. A. 1943, provides :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is
to be preferred which will prevent a total intestacy.'
In the instant case, the express language of
the will covers only two of three possible f'act
situations respecting the time of the testator's
death in relation to the time of his wife's death.
Had the testator's wife survived him or had she
perished with him in a common disaster, the
testator's intent as to the disposition of the estate
is clear. But the testator's intention in the advent
of the death of his wife prior to his demise is not
expressly made known nor can it fairly be implied
from a language of the will. The rule of construction that the intent of the testator must be carried
out does not authorize courts to make a new will
to conform to what they think the testator
intended, but the intent of the testator must be
ascertained from the will as it stands. In re
Estate of Sowash, 62 Cal. App. 512, 516, 217 P.
123. Nor does the rule that testacy rather than
intestacy is preferred relieve courts from the
obligation to construe the language of the will
according to the legal effect of the words used.''

. In re Klewer's Estate, (Cal.) 268 P. 2d 544, the Court
said:
"In the interpretation of a will, ascertainment of the testator's intention is the fundamental
rule of construction, to which all others are subordinate.''
Page on Wills, V·ol. 2, Ch. 22, Sec. 914, p. 789 and
Sec. 916, p. 793.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In that respect, see 22 Ky. Law Journal 469, at page 494
and 26 Georgetown Law Journal 786 (These Journals
are in the University of Utah Law Library, but are not
found in the Utah State Library.)
The instrument dated the 14th day of January, 1952,
starts out by the underlined words, ''Holographic Will,''
and the next sentence starts out: "This is the last will
of me, Florence P. Howard." In that will she appoints
Royal Trust Company, :.Montreal, as Executor, in collaberation with \Y alker Bank & Trust Company. In the
1939 instrument, she appointed the Royal Trust Company, if she died domiciled in Canada, but the Guaranty
Trust Company of New York City, if she died domiciled
in the United States. In the 1949 instrument, she
appointed "Walker Bank & Trust Company, Administra,..
tor and Executor of my estate" and the Royal Trust
Company for Canadian administration.. In the 1940
document entitled, ''Appended to holographic will,'' she
said nothing about an executor. In e-ach C'ase, she began
the document with the words "Holographic Will," except
in the 1940 instrument, where she headed it, "Appended
to holographic will." In the 1939 instrument and the 1949
and 1952 instruments, she began the will by sfating, "This
is the last will of me Florence P. Howard,'' or ''Florence
Patterson Howard.''
In the 1939 instrument, she stated that after all
bequests and expenses had been paid, the balance of the
estate was to be divided among certain persons in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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proportions. In the 1940 instrument, this division was
changed. In the 1949 Instrument, the division again was
changed. In the 1952 instrument, some of the persons
getting certain 20ths were given specific bequests instead
of a certain percentage and specific items were changed
in bequests in many ways from one to another.
See Sandford vs. Vaughn, 1 Phil. Eccl. Rep. 39,
161 Eng. Reprint 907.
It will be noted that in the 1939 document she said, "at
the present writing, there is more than sufficient cash to
cover the special cash bequests and expenses of the
estate.''
In the instrument of 1952, many changes were made
in the bequests of jewelry and other things. The manner
in which the Testatrix changed the items and objects of
her bounty, showed the intent of the Testatrix to revoke
the previous instruments and to make a final will on
January 14, 1952, which contained provisions wholly
inconsistent with the former instruments, and the intent
to revoke the former instruments.
The inconsistences between the last instrument and
the previous ones, show a desire to depart from the
previous documents and the first three instruments are
revoked in their entirety. !(~earns vs. Roush, 146 S.E.
729, 15 Iowa Law Review 232.
An examination of the original instruments shows
that the Testatrix knew the difference between a codicil

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and a will, since she had written on the top of one page,
"Codicil," although she had not written anything more
than that.
Appellants are limited in the amount of money available for writing a Brief in this matter, and therefore
respectfully refer the Court to Point No. IV in the
Brief filed by Appellants in the Case No. 7970, where
the matter of the inconsistent disposition of the various
items is fully set forth and which shows provisions in
the 1952 instrument which are wholly inconsistent with
each and all of the previous instruments.
There is no hard and fast rule which requires the
testator to dispose of all of his property.
See Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Ch. 15, Sec.
464, p. 837 and Ch. 22, §927, p. 852.
51 A L R p. 661, 664, 667, 668 and 675 and 683.
There are three methods of revoking a former will
by a later will: 1. Expressly revoking it, or 2. Disposing of all property by second will, or 3. By provisions
so inconsistent that the two cannot stand together.
See 68 C. J., Sec. 491, page 803.
We come under the latter. In the 1952 instrument, the
Testatrix attempted to dispose of all of her property. At
the bottom of the first page of said instrument is the
statement, "If after taxes and estate expenses are paid,
there is a surplus of over $50,000.00; I wish the above
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cash (tax free) payments to be doubled, including
$50,000.00 to Rosamond Lamb, Montreal.'' This must be
given weight and the intention of the Testatrix must have
been to dispose of her estate by the 1952 instrument.
It was stipulated that the Testatrix had the three
former instruments with her at the time she wrote the
fourth instrument. In the case of Shiel vs. O'Brien, Ir.
Rep. 7 Eq. 64, the Court held that if a person had an
earlier will before him, and executed a second will, complete in form, the intention of the testator was obviously
to revoke the first. The fact that the entire estate was
not disposed of is not governing against the intention of
the testator.

In re Wuppermam's Estate, 300 N.Y. Supp. 344.
51 A L R '684.

In re Bjor's Estate (Cal.) 229 P. 2d 468.
As is said in the case of In .re Klewer's Est.ate, 268
P. 2d 544, at page 546:
''A testator has the right to make a will
which does not dispose of all of his property, but
leaves a residue to pass to his heirs under the law
of succession. ***To say that because a will
does not dispose of all of the testator's property
it is ambiguous and must be construed so as to
prevent intestacy, either total or partial, is to use
a rule of construction as the reason for construction. A will is not open to construction merely
because it does no dispose of all of the testator's
property. 'Courts are not permitted in order to
avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
struction based on conjecture as to what the testator 1nay have intended, although not expressed.''
There can be no question but ·w·hat a will may be
revoked by a later holographic will.
In re Wallace's Estate, 223 P. 2d 284;
Phillips vs. Smith, 100 P. 2d 244;
In re Giff's Estate, 232 P. 2d 328.

A later will may revoke a former will even though
there is no express revocation of the former will.
In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299.

The rationale underlying such a decision is the intention
of the testator, as is said in Volume 1, Page on Wills,
Lifetime Edition, at page 801:
"Intention is said to be an act of the mind.
To be operative as a revocation, this act of the
. mind must be demonstrated by some outward and
visible act of revocation, which must be one of the
acts which are given in the statutes which regulate
revocation by an act manifest on the face of the
will.''
In the instant case, we submit that the intention of the
Testatrix was to execute the will dated January 14, 1952
as her last will and testament and to revoke 'all nrinr
wills. The instrument of January 14, 1952 contains all
the formal clauses necessary for a will, together with the
dispositive provisions. While the words, ''This is the
last will of me,'' is not conclusive in this case, it does
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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indicate the intention of the Testatrix, and together
with the other indicies of intention shown in the document, establish the Testatrix's intention that the last
document, which she executed, was to be her will.
Section 74-1-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
''A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent
will, unless the latter contains an express revocation or provisions wholly inconsistent with the
terms of the former will; but in other cases the
prior will remains effectual so far as consistent
with the provisions of the subsequent will.''
The provisions of the instrument dated January 14, 1952
are so wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the
former instruments, that under the terms of our Statute,
it revokes the former instruments. This Statute has been
confirmed in re Love's Estate, supra.
The Utah Statute provides that if a second instrument contains provisions wholly inconsistent with the
first, the second instrument revokes the first. The only
time the second instrument does not revoke the first is,
''the other cases,'' and then, in such event, the prior
will remains effectual so far as consistent with provisions of the subsequent will. The words contained in
the Statute, ''in other cases,'' means cases in which there
are no provisions of the second will inconsistent with
the terms of the first will, or where there is no express
revocation clause.
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In re Lore's Estate, supra, Justice Harris stated:
''The two documents here .offered as one will,
are so completely inconsistent or antagonistic in
their provisions, in that Exhibit 'D' undertakes
to give all the residue of the estate to the Taylors,
while Exhibit 'E' undertakes to give it all to the
\Yilsons, that there appears to be no way that
these could be constructed together as a part of
a harmoneous whole will. On the contrary, had
they both been legally executed, the former will
would have been revoked by the later, even though
there was no express revocation of the former
will.,,
In the instant case, the provisions of the last document
are so inconsistent and antagonistic to the provisions of
the former documents, that they cannot be construed
together as a harmoneous whole, and on the contrary,
show that the Testatrix intended to revoke the former
instruments by the later. While it is true that in re
Love's Estate it is stated that the whole residue in each
will was given to different people, that is not the controlling point. The residuary clauses were the inconsistent dispositions in the case decided in re Love's Estate,
supra. In the instant case, we have pointed out many
examples of inconsistent dispositions of property, executors and the changing of legatees.
The rule concerning a residual clause and the disposition of all of the testator's property is found at
chapter 15, Section 464, page 837, Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Volume 1, wherein it is said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"If the later will dispose of all of testator's
property, and it remains in effect until testator's
death, it necessarily revokes an earlier will. If
the first will contains a residuary clause, and the
second will attempts to dispose of all of testator's
property, the second will operates as a revocation
although it contains neither a residuary clause nor
a clause of revocation. If the second will contains
a residuary clause which purports to dispose of
all of testator's property, the second will operates
as a revocation of the first will, including specific
legacies and devises therein.''
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact are not
supported by the evidence and are contrary to the evidence; that the Conclusions of Law are not supported
by the Findings and are contrary to law and erroneous ;
and that the Findings, Conclusions and Decree are so
indefinite that the Executor will be requested to use his
own choice and discretion as to what the instruments
mean. That the Court did not find on the issues presented by the Petition to Construe and the Answers
thereto. That the Judgment of the Court is contrary to
\

law in that all instruments are admitted as the will
instead of the 1952 instrument being held to be the last
will.
The Judgment should be reversed.
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The Court should order that the costs of Appellants
on this Appeal be paid out of the assets of the estate,
pursuant to Sec. 75-14-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER AND LAZIER,
JOHN D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J.
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B.
FEIGHT,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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